Abstract-We design a jamming-resistant receiver scheme to enhance the robustness of a massive MIMO uplink system against jamming. We assume that a jammer attacks the system both in the pilot and data transmission phases. The key feature of the proposed scheme is that, in the pilot phase, the base station estimates not only the legitimate channel, but also the jamming channel by exploiting a purposely unused pilot sequence. The jamming channel estimate is used to construct linear receiver filters that reject the impact of the jamming signal. The performance of the proposed scheme is analytically evaluated using the asymptotic properties of massive MIMO. The best regularized zero-forcing receiver and the optimal power allocations for the legitimate system and the jammer are also studied. Numerical results are provided to verify our analysis and show that the proposed scheme greatly improves the achievable rates, as compared with conventional receivers. Interestingly, the proposed scheme works particularly well under strong jamming attacks, since the improved estimate of the jamming channel outweighs the extra jamming power.
with lower transmit power, active jamming attacks are a big challenge. Jamming devices used to be military-grade, but nowadays one can obtain a jamming device by modifying the firmware of commodity hardware [4] . When a massive MIMO system is attacked by jamming, especially in the pilot phase, the additional pilot contamination caused by the jamming leads to an inability to suppress the jamming and this translates into a significant reduction of the achievable rates [3] .
Although jamming exists and has been identified as a critical problem for reliable communications [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , there are only a few works focusing on the jamming aspects in massive MIMO [2] , [3] , [10] [11] [12] [13] . For instance, optimized jamming is studied for uplink massive MIMO in [12] , which shows that a smart jammer can cause substantial jamming pilot contamination that degrades the sum rate. In order to detect pilot contamination attacks in massive MIMO, several jamming detection techniques are introduced in [2] and [10] . Jamming defense mechanisms for massive MIMO are proposed in [3] , [10] , in which secret keys are employed to encrypt and protect the legitimate signal from jamming attacks. The authors of [13] investigates an artificial noise-aided transmitter for secure communications in the presence of attackers capable of both jamming and eavesdropping.
Pilot contamination appears when the pilot signal, transmitted for estimation of a user channel, is interfered by another transmission [14] . The typical effect is that the base station (BS) cannot use the estimated channel to coherently combine the desired signal, without also coherently combining the interference. Pilot contamination between legitimate users of the system is a big challenge in massive MIMO, but can be substantially suppressed by pilot coordination across cells [15] , [16] or by exploiting second-order channel statistics [17] , [18] . Jamming pilot contamination is more difficult to deal with, because the jammer refuses to coordinate itself with the system and attempts to create maximum pilot contamination rather than minimum. Since the knowledge of the structure and properties of the jamming attack is limited, a typical approach to deal with jamming signals is to treat them as additive noise and design the transceivers as if there was no jamming [3] , [12] . However, jamming in massive MIMO is not noise-like since the legitimate channel estimate is correlated with the jamming channel.
In this paper, we propose a novel jamming-resistant receiver scheme that utilizes the high spatial resolution provided by massive MIMO to reject jamming signals. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been done in prior work. We consider the uplink since we want evaluate to what extent the multiantenna BS can reject the jamming spatially. In particular, we construct the receiver filters using not only an esti-mate of the legitimate channel but also an estimate of the jamming channel, which is obtained from a purposely unused orthogonal pilot sequence. We consider regularized zeroforcing (RZF) receiver filters, which are conventionally used to reject interference between legitimate users, and generalize the concept to also reject jamming. To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, the achievable rates are analyzed and closed-form large-scale approximations are obtained. Based on the analytical results, we derive the rate-maximizing regularization factor for the RZF receiver. Moreover, we study how a legitimate user should allocate its power between the pilot and data phases. We obtain a new asymptotically optimal power allocation for systems with a very large number of antennas and a suboptimal power allocation for cases with a finite number of antennas. We also consider the jammer's optimal power allocation. Simulation results are provided, which reveal that the proposed jamming-resistant receivers and power allocation substantially improve the system performance over conventional schemes.
This is a continuation of the conference paper [19] and the novel aspects include asymptotic analysis, optimization of the regularization factor, transmit power optimization, full proofs of the analytical results, and new simulations.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the problem setup and signal models for the pilot and data transmission phases. Section III considers the channel estimations and jamming-resistant receiver design. In Section IV, closed-form large-scale approximations of the achievable rates of the proposed schemes are provided. The best RZF receiver and effects of the jamming powers are also analyzed in this section. Sections V and VI study the optimal power allocation for the legitimate system and the jammer, respectively. Numerical results are then provided in Section VII and the main conclusions are given in Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a single-user massive MIMO uplink consisting of a BS, a legitimate user and a jammer, as depicted in Fig. 1 . We assume that the BS is equipped with M antennas, while the legitimate user and the jammer have a single antenna each. This basic model captures the main principle of jamming, and the methodology can be generalized to having multiple legitimate users.
Let us denote h ∈ C M×1 and g ∈ C M×1 as the channel vectors from the legitimate user and the jammer to the BS, respectively. We assume that the elements of h are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian (ZMCSCG) random variables, i.e., h ∼ CN (0, β u I M ), where the variance β u represents the large-scale fading. Similarly, we assume that g ∼ CN (0, β j I M ), where the variance β j represents the largescale fading. The channels h and g are independent.
We consider a block-fading model, in which the channel remains constant during a coherence block of T symbol times, which is computed in practice as the product of the coherence time and the coherence bandwidth. Signals consisting of T symbols can be transmitted in a coherence block and these signals can be conveniently represented by T -length vectors. The channel varies independently from one coherence block to the next. The communication between the legitimate user and the BS follows a two-phase transmission protocol. In the first phase (pilot phase), the legitimate user sends a pilot sequence to the BS for channel estimation. In the second phase (data transmission phase), the legitimate user transmits its payload data to the BS. We assume that the jammer attacks the system both in the pilot and data transmission phases, while attacking only one of the phases is a special case.
A. Pilot Phase
During the first τ symbols of a coherence block (τ < T ), the user transmits a pilot sequence s u of length τ symbols with s u 2 = 1. This pilot originates from a pilot codebook S containing τ orthogonal unit-power vectors. We assume that there is (at least) one pilot sequence that is unused. 1 We further assume that the jammer is aware of the transmission protocol but the legitimate system uses a pilot hopping scheme such that the jammer cannot know the users' current pilot sequences. More precisely, the user is assigned a nominal pilot sequence and the seed to a pseudo-random number generator. It is used to rotate the pilot sequence randomly in each coherence block, for example, by multiplying the nominal sequence with a random unitary matrix. 2 This makes s u a random sequence and the jammer cannot know which pilot sequence is currently used by the legitimate user. We let s j denote the τ -length sequence transmitted by the jammer in the pilot phase and it also satisfies s j 2 = s H j s j = 1. The average squared inner product
τ between the sequences transmitted by the user and the jammer is independent of the choice of the jammer sequence; that is, any jamming sequence is probabilistically equally good. However, to prevent the legitimate system from detecting the jamming sequence, a smart jammer will select s j as uniformly distributed over the unit sphere in C τ . Accordingly, the received signal at the M antennas of the BS in the τ symbol times of the pilot phase can be stacked as
where Y t ∈ C M×τ , and p u and p j are the transmit powers per symbol of the user and jammer, respectively, in the pilot phase. The additive noise matrix N t ∈ C M×τ is assumed to have i.i.d. ZMCSCG elements, i.e., vec
where σ 2 is the noise variance and vec(N t ) is the vectorization of N t .
B. Data Transmission Phase
During the last (T − τ ) symbols of a coherence block, the user transmits payload data to the BS and the jammer continues to interfere by sending a jamming signal. We denote by x u and x j the transmitted symbols from the user and the jammer, respectively, at an arbitrary occasion in the data phase. These symbols satisfy E{|x u | 2 } = 1 and E{|x j | 2 } = 1. The received signal at the BS is
where the additive noise vector n d is assumed to have i.i.d. CN (0, σ 2 ) elements, q u and q j are the transmit powers from the user and jammer in the data transmission phase, respectively. Note that the jammer uses power p j in the pilot phase and a potentially different power q j in the data phase.
To detect x u based on y d , the BS uses a linear receiver filter as follows:
where a ∈ C M×1 is the receiver filter, which will be carefully selected in the next section to reject the jamming. The received signal in (3) can be rewritten as
By treating √ q u E{a H h|s j } as the deterministic channel that the desired signal is received over and treating the last three terms (which are uncorrelated with x u ) as worst-case independent Gaussian noise, an achievable rate for the legitimate user in the massive MIMO uplink is
where the pre-log factor 1 − τ T accounts for the channel estimation overhead and ρ is the effective signal-to-interferenceand-noise ratio (SINR), which is given by
and var{a H h|s j } = E{|a H h| 2 |s j } − |E{a H h|s j }| 2 . This is a lower bound on the capacity and follows directly from [1, Section 2.3.5], which considers a fading channel with side-information (in this case s j ). In (6), the numerator (q u |E{a H h|s j }| 2 ) represents the effective desired signal power. The first term (q u var{a H h|s j }), second term (q j E{|a H g| 2 |s j }), and third term (σ 2 E{ a 2 |s j }) in the denominator of (6) correspond to the undesired signals' powers resulted from the channel uncertainty, jamming, and additive noise, respectively. Typically, due to the channel hardening in massive MIMO, the power terms associated with the channel uncertainty and additive noise are negligible compared to the desired signal term and the jamming term. 3 In order to improve the system performance, one can focus on selecting the receiver filter a such that it amplifies the desired signal (q u |E{a H h|s j }| 2 is large), while mitigating the jamming signal (q j E{|a H g| 2 |s j } is as small as possible). 
III. CHANNEL ESTIMATION AND JAMMING-RESISTANT RECEIVER DESIGN
The achievable rate in (5) highly depends on the choice of the receiver filter a. To harvest an array gain, it should be selected as a function of the received pilot signal in the pilot phase. In this section, we propose a jamming-resistant receiver filter, which is constructed based on not only the estimate of the legitimate channel but also on an estimate of the jamming channel.
A. Channel Estimation
In order to estimate the legitimate channel h, the received pilot signal Y t is first correlated with the user's pilot sequence s u as
Since the BS does not know s T j s * u , but only its distribution (as explained below), the linear MMSE estimate of the zero-mean variable h given y u is [20] 
where
In order to perform the estimation in (8) , the BS needs to know p j β j . This term can be estimated by the BS by letting the user be silent at some random occasions (unknown to the jammer) and then measure the corresponding power level or by using blind estimation techniques [21] . When M is large, the law of large numbers implies that a single observation of the jamming signal is sufficient to get a good estimate of p j β j and q j β j , thus the BS can track its value even when the jammer is moving or changes its power.
As we can see from (8) , the legitimate channel estimate h is correlated with the jamming channel g. Without the knowledge of the jamming channel g, the receiver filter a is generally chosen as a linear function of h. In the absence of jamming, the optimal receiver filter is
which is known as maximal ratio combining (MRC). If such a receiver filter is used heuristically in the presence of jamming, the correlation with the jamming channel (in the sense that E{g H h|s j } = Mα 2 β j ) results in an amplification of the jamming signal. This leads to a degradation of the system performance [3] , known as jamming pilot contamination. In order to mitigate this effect, we propose to design the receiver filter based on both h and g. However, since h and g are not available at the BS, we construct receiver filters using their estimates instead.
Recall that there is (at least) one unused pilot sequence, preserved in the system, which is orthogonal to the user's pilot s u . By projecting the received pilot signal Y t onto this unused pilot sequence, the user's pilot signal is eliminated, leaving only the jamming signal (and noise). The resulting signal is
where s u is the unused pilot sequence, satisfying s T u s * u = 0. An estimate of the jamming channel g can be obtained as
We note that the quality of the jamming channel estimate g depends on the value of |s T j s * u |. It can happen that |s T j s * u | = 0, but the probability is zero since s j is a continuous random vector, which is uniformly distributed over the unit sphere. Moreover, when there are more than one unused pilot sequence, one can improve the quality of the jamming channel estimate g by selecting the unused pilot sequence, which maximizes |s T j s * u | or combining all of them. In this paper, we pick one unused pilot at random, to focus on the basic behaviors, and leave potential improvements for future work.
B. Jamming-Resistant Receiver
Based on the estimates h and g, we now construct a jamming-resistant receiver, which is inspired by the conventional RZF receiver [22] . Accordingly, we propose the following RZF receiver 4
where μ ≥ 0 is the regularization factor, determining the amount of interference power remaining at the receiver [22] . By adjusting μ, one can balance between the targets of amplifying the desired signal and mitigating the undesired jamming signal to optimize the overall system performance.
In the following, we consider two common examples of the RZF receiver. 1) MMSE-Type Receiver: First, we consider the MMSE receiver filter, which is optimal when the receiver has perfect channel state information. Let us rewrite the received signal in (2) as
where e u h − h and e j g − g are the estimation errors of the legitimate and jamming channel, respectively. By treating w √ q u e u x u + √ q j e j x j + n d as equivalent uncorrelated additive Gaussian noise, an MMSE-type receiver filter can be obtained as
where is the covariance matrix of the signal associated with estimation errors plus noise, i.e.,
Since s j is unknown, the expectation in (14) is over all random variables including s j . Therefore, the equivalent noise variance σ 2 e is given by σ
The MMSE-type receiver filter in (13) corresponds to an RZF receiver filter with μ = σ 2 e /q j . Note that our setup includes the jamming pilot contamination, which makes the equivalent noise w correlated with the estimated channels h and g. The receiver filter in (13) is thus not the true MMSE filter, i.e., a MMSE may not be optimal in the conventional sense. That is why we call a MMSE an "MMSE-type" receiver filter.
2) ZF-Type Receiver: Motivated by the fact that the jamming signal is a main source of limitation in massive MIMO, we also consider a receiver that focuses on nulling the jamming signal, i.e., a ZF-type receiver. We show that a RZF corresponds to a ZF-type receiver when μ → 0.
Following the matrix inversion lemma [23, Lemma 2], the RZF receiver in (12) can be expressed as
Since a deterministic scalar factor does not change the performance of a linear receiver filter (it appears in all terms in the SINR), the RZF receiver in (15) is equivalent tõ
Therefore, when μ → 0 the RZF receiver a RZF becomes a ZF-type receiver a ZF , which can be expressed as
Note that we have used the projection-matrix expression for ZF in (17) , which is equivalent to using pseudo-inverses. Due to the imperfect channel estimation, the linear receiver in (17) is not an exact ZF receiver since g H a ZF = 0 but g H a ZF is generally non-zero. Thus, we call the linear receiver in (17) a "ZF-type" receiver. The matrix-vector multiplications in (16) and (17) only contain standard linear algebra operations that are easy to implement in hardware and can be parallelized across antennas. In comparison to other baseband processing that is required in a massive MIMO system, the added complexity of the jamming rejection is negligible.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the different proposed receivers and derive the rate-maximizing regularization factor for the RZF receiver. The performance of the proposed receivers are also analyzed for systems with extremely strong jammers.
A. Large-Scale Approximations
First of all, let us analyze the effective SINR, which is achieved by the RZF receiver. By exploiting the asymptotic properties of massive MIMO, we can obtain a closed-form large-scale approximation of the effective SINR ρ, i.e., an approximation of the effective SINR which almost surely (a.s.) converges to its true value when the number of antennas M tends to infinity. To this end, we use the following notation: for two sequences 
− −−− →
M→∞ 0" denotes a.s. convergence. We now obtain the following largescale approximation.
Theorem 1: Assume that the RZF receiver a = a RZF is used for a fixed μ, then a large-scale approximation of the effective SINR in (6) can be obtained as ρ ρ RZF , where ρ RZF is given by (18) , as shown at the top of the next page,
When the RZF receiver is used, the power terms of the effective SINR in (6) can be calculated as follows.
Thus, it follows that
μ α 1 β u and we can use the dominated convergence theorem to further obtain convergence of the mean value as
· The signal gain uncertainty term q u var{a H h|s j } By using the large-scale approximations in (19) , (21), (22), and (23) we have
Thus, by the dominated convergence theorem, it follows that
Therefore,
· The jamming term q j E{|a H g| 2 |s j } By following similar steps as when analyzing the desired signal term in (19), we have
j γ j and then by the dominated convergence theorem it follows that the mean value behaves as
· The noise term σ 2 E{ a 2 |s j } Once again, by following similar steps as for the desired signal term, when M → ∞ we have
Substituting (25), (26), (27), and (28) into (6), we obtain a large-scale approximation of ρ as in (29), as shown at the top of the next page. By denoting δ 1 = |s T j s * u | 2 , δ 2 = |s T j s * u | 2 and using the fact that
j τ p j δ 2 , the effective SINR in (29) can be rewritten as in (18) . This completes the proof for Theorem 1.
From Theorem 1 and its proof, we revisit our discussions in the end of Section II regarding to the impact of different
power terms in the effective SINR. We can see that when M is large, the power terms associated with the channel uncertainty and additive noise scale with M and are negligible compared to the desired signal term and the jamming term, which scale with M 2 . Moreover, as we have discussed in Remark 1, the effective SINR ρ RZF is dependent on δ 1 = |s T j s * u | 2 and δ 2 = |s T j s * u | 2 . Although s j is unknown a priori, the BS can estimate δ 1 and δ 2 very accurately thanks to the asymptotic properties of massive MIMO. Following from (7), (10) , and the law of large numbers, we have
Therefore, the BS can estimate δ 1 and δ 2 as
When M is large, which is the case in massive MIMO, the estimates in (31) are very close to the true values of δ 1 and δ 2 . Thus, the BS can evaluate the effective SINR ρ RZF with high accuracy, as we will show in the numerical analysis in Section VII. A closed-form large-scale approximation of the effective SINR achieved by the MMSE-type receiver can be obtained from Theorem 1 by setting μ = Furthermore, when the number of antennas M tends to infinity, both the effective SINRs with MMSE-type and ZF-type receiver filters converge to the same finite limit. Let us call this the asymptotic effective SINR ρ asy , then we have
This implies that when the number of antennas grows large, the effective SINR with the RZF receiver for any regularization factor μ converges to a finite limit, which is independent of μ. Note that, besides the expected "signal-to-jamming ratio" term
[12], the asymptotic effective SINR contains the scaling factor
which is resulted from the proposed jamming channel estimation scheme. It is interesting to see that this scaling factor increases with the jamming pilot power p j , i.e., the benefit of the proposed scheme is greater with stronger jamming pilot signal. Moreover, after some simple mathematical manipulations it can be shown that the asymptotic effective SINR ρ asy is an increasing function w.r.t.
. In other words, the achievable rate increases with the jamming pilot power p j when p j is higher than a certain level. Intuitively, when p j is large enough, the improvement in the estimation quality of the jamming channel, resulted from the increase of p j , surpasses the degradation in estimation quality of the legitimate channel. Therefore, it is expected that the proposed receivers can work well or even better with stronger jamming pilot signal. Section VI shows how the jammer can utilize this result to optimize its power allocation. (12) (by setting h = h k ), then a k is independent of h i for all i = k. Therefore,
In other words, the proposed receiver is robust against inter-user interference when M → ∞ and can also be applied in a multi-user setup.
B. Best RZF Receiver
For a finite number of antennas M, the performance of the proposed RZF receiver highly depends on the regularization factor μ. In the following, we derive the best μ, which maximizes the effective SINR ρ RZF , i.e., we find the best RZF receiver. Using the results from Theorem 1, we can prove the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Assume that the RZF receiver a = a RZF is used. The effective SINR ρ RZF in (18) approaches its maximum when μ → 0, i.e., the ZF-type receiver is the best RZF receiver.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A. Corollary 1 shows that in massive MIMO systems with jamming attacks, the simple ZF-type receiver outperforms other RZF receivers with non-zero μ, including the MMSE-type receiver. This is a surprising result, but understandable since the MMSE-type receiver is not an optimal receiver, as discussed in Section III-B.1. As shown in [22] , the regularization factor μ determines the amount of interference (or jamming in our case) remaining at the receiver as compared to the additive noise. Moreover, jamming pilot contamination, resulting in coherent combining of the jamming signal is a main source of limitation in massive MIMO. Therefore, a favorable approach to deal with jamming attacks in massive MIMO is to perform ZF processing and focus on suppressing the jamming signal.
C. Extremely Strong Jamming
Next, we investigate the performance of the proposed receivers for a system with extremely strong jamming, where the jamming powers grow without bound, while the user's powers are fixed and finite. This asymptotic analysis will show that extremely strong jamming is not necessarily more efficient than moderate jamming. Based on the results from Theorem 1, we can prove the following.
Corollary 2: Assume that the RZF receiver a = a RZF is used. For p j = λq j → ∞, where λ is a finite strictly positive constant, we have:
• For μ > 0: ρ RZF → 0.
• For μ = 0:
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. In Corollary 2, we only consider cases when the power of the jamming pilot signal p j grows jointly with the power of the jamming data signal q j . The results for the other trivial cases, i.e., ( p j = const., q j → ∞) and (p j → ∞, q j = const.) can be obtained as follows:
• If p j = const., q j → ∞: ρ RZF converges to zero for all values of μ.
• If p j → ∞, q j = const.: ρ RZF converges to zero for μ > 0 and ρ RZF = ρ ZF converges to a non-zero finite value for μ = 0. Corollary 2 implies that the proposed ZF-type receiver works well even under extremely strong jamming, as long as the power p j of the jamming pilot signal increases jointly with the power q j of the jamming data signal. This is consistent with our analysis in Section IV-A, which indicated that the proposed scheme can work well and even better with stronger jamming pilot signal. This behavior is due to the fact that our proposed receivers are constructed based on the jamming channel estimate g and its quality is improved when the jamming pilot power p j increases. We can thus reject the jamming better and better as p j → ∞, but the jamming still remains since also q j → ∞. In light of this result, a smart jammer with a large power budget will concentrate on jamming the data signals and limit the jamming of the pilot signals, to avoid that the BS acquires a good estimate of the jamming channel. This is further studied in Section VI.
V. POWER ALLOCATION IN THE LEGITIMATE SYSTEM
In this section, we will show how the legitimate user should allocate its power between the pilot phase and data transmission phase to maximize the achievable rate, in the presence of jamming. We consider two optimization approaches, which use the asymptotic effective SINR ρ asy and the ZF-type effective SINR ρ ZF as the objective functions for the cases of infinite and finite number of antennas, respectively.
A. Power Allocation for Infinite M
First, we derive the optimal power allocation for the case with an infinite number of antennas. Assuming that the jamming transmit powers ( p u , q u ) and the jamming channel gain β j are fixed, the legitimate user aims to maximize ρ asy by optimally allocating its transmit powers ( p u , q u ) during the pilot phase and data transmission phase. This optimization needs to be updated when the jammer moves or changes its powers. We assume that the transmit powers of the legitimate user satisfy
where P u is the power limit of the legitimate user. Given the power constraint in (36), we consider the asymptotically optimal power allocation problem, expressed as
Proposition 1: The solution to (37) is given by
Proof: Following from (34), the objective function ρ asy in (37) can be rewritten as
We note that ρ asy is a linear function of the multiplication p u q u . Therefore, the optimization problem (37) is equivalent to
Since p u q u is an increasing function w.r.t. p u and q u , the optimal solution is achieved with equality in the first constraint, i.e., p u = (T P u − (T − τ )q u )/τ . Substituting this equality into the objective function in (40), we achieve an equivalent unconstrained optimization problem with a second-order polynomial objective function and a single variable q u , which can be easily solved to obtain (38). Proposition 1 shows that, for the given average power budget P u and coherence interval T , the asymptotically optimal power allocation ( p asy−opt u , q asy−opt u ) depends only on the pilot length τ . Moreover, we note that τ p asy−opt u
Hence, it is optimal to equally divide the transmit energy for the pilot and data transmission phases when the number of antennas is very large (M → ∞). This result confirms the importance of the channel estimation in massive MIMO.
The optimal power allocation problem in (37) is designed for a system with an infinite number of antennas. However, as it will be shown in the numerical analysis, the performance loss is relative small when the asymptotic optimal power allocation in (38) is employed for a system with a finite number of antennas. Therefore, the power allocation in (38) can be applied as a simple heuristic power allocation that does not depend on the jammer's powers and signal structure.
B. Power Allocation for Finite M
In the following, we consider the power allocation that maximizes the achievable rate for a system with finite number of antennas. We have shown in Section IV that the ZF-type receiver is the best RZF receiver. Thus, we focus on optimizing the power allocation for a system with the ZF-type receiver. Accordingly, the optimal power allocation problem can be expressed as
The solution for the optimization problem (41) is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The solution to (41) is given by
Proof: Following from (33), the objective function ρ ZF in (41) can be rewritten as
where ν is defined in (43). Therefore, the optimal power allocation problem (33) is equivalent to
By dividing both the numerator and denominator of the objective function in (45) by p u q u , an equivalent optimization problem of (45) is obtained as
We note that the objective function of the optimization problem in (46) is a decreasing function w.r.t. p u and q u . The optimal solution is achieved when having equality in the first constraint, i.e., p u = (T P u − (T − τ )q u )/τ . Substituting this equality into the objective function in (46), we achieve an equivalent optimization problem with single variable q u , which is convex. Solving this equivalent optimization problem using the Lagrangian multiplier method and Karush-KuhnTucker (KKT) conditions [24] , we obtain the optimal power allocation in (42).
It is worth noting that the parameter ν in Proposition 2 is dependent on δ 1 = |s T j s * u | 2 and δ 2 = |s T j s * u | 2 . Therefore, in order to utilize the optimal power allocation in (42), the legitimate user needs to know the jamming sequence s j or at least the correlation of the jamming sequence with the pilot sequences, i.e., |s T j s * u | 2 and |s T j s * u | 2 . However, the jamming sequence s j is typically unknown by the legitimate user. Therefore, we consider the achievable rate achieved by the power allocation in (42) as an upper bound that can be achieved with perfect knowledge of s j .
Assuming that s j is unknown, we propose a suboptimal power allocation solution motivated by the solution in (42). For instance, by replacing δ 1 and δ 2 with their mean values, a suboptimal power allocation solution for the case of finite number of antennas can be used as
whereν is an approximation of the parameter ν, given bỹ
In (48) the second equality follows from 
VI. POWER ALLOCATION AT THE JAMMER
The recent paper [12] optimized the jamming power allocation in a similar uplink massive MIMO as in this paper, but assumed MRC at the BS. While this paper focuses on jamming rejection, in this section we will briefly describe how the jammer can adjust its power to minimize the achievable rate. Similar to (36), we assume that the transmit powers of the jammer satisfy
where P j is the power limit. Focusing on the asymptotic case when M → ∞, we express the jamming power allocation problem as
Proposition 3: The solution to (50) is given by
Proof: By combining (34) and (35), we notice that
is a decreasing function of q j and thus the power constraint in (50) must be satisfied with equality at the optimal solution. This implies q j =
By substituting q j into (52), taking the first derivative with respect to p j , and equating to zero, we obtain
as the jamming pilot power that minimizes ρ asy . Several observations can be made from the asymptotically optimal jamming power allocation in Proposition 3. First, we notice that it is optimal to assign non-zero power to both the pilot and data phases. Second, when P j → ∞, the jammer will use a fixed power p
in the jamming phase to prevent the BS from estimating the jamming channel perfectly, while in the data phase q asy−opt j → ∞. Note that
is the largest sensible jamming pilot power, since we previously noted that ρ asy is an increasing function w.r.t.
. Finally, the optimal solution is independent of the power of the legitimate user, thus there is no need to formulate a game where the user and jammer updates their powers iteratively.
We also note that δ 2 is typically unknown by the jammer, a suboptimal jamming power allocation can be obtained by replacing δ 2 with its mean value 1/τ in (51), leading to
VII. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of different linear receivers, including the proposed jammingresistant receivers, in term of the average achievable rates. The average in (5) is taken over 10000 realizations of s j . We consider a coherence block of T = 200 symbols and τ = 3. We normalize the channel and noise variances as β u = β j = σ 2 = 1. This implies that p u , q u are the signal-tonoise ratios (SNRs) in the pilot and data phases, respectively, and that p j , q j are the jamming SNRs in the pilot and data phases, respectively. Note that a high SNR can be achieved by using high transmit power and/or having a short distance to the BS-the effect is identical when it comes to communication performance.
For comparison with prior work [3] , [12] , we also consider the rate achieved by the conventional MRC receiver a mrc = h, defined in (9) in this section. Note that MRC does not use the estimate g. 
A. Performance With Different Linear Receivers
First, we compare the performance of the different linear receivers. Fig. 2 shows the achievable rates versus the number of antennas at the BS. We assume that p u = q u = p j = q j = SNR and consider different values: SNR ∈ {0 dB, 5 dB, 10 dB}. As expected, the proposed receiver filters based on the jamming channel estimate can remarkably improve the system performance, as compared to the MRC receiver. The achievable rates calculated based on the analysis in Theorem 1 (curves with "anal.") are close to the Monte-Carlo simulations (curves with "simul."), and will be asymptotically tight as M → ∞. Moreover, we can see that the simple ZF-type receiver filter works particularly well and outperforms the MMSE-type receiver filter. This behavior confirms the results from Corollary 1 and shows that in massive MIMO, when the jamming effect is critical, a favorable receiver solution is to focus on nulling the jamming signal.
B. Impact of Jamming Powers
Next, we exemplify the effect of the jamming powers on the system performance. We consider two scenarios with extremely strong jamming. In the first scenario (Fig. 3) , we fix the legitimate user's transmit powers as p u = q u = 5 dB, and increase both the jammer's transmit powers p j and q j jointly from −20 dB to 40 dB. In the second scenario (Fig. 4) , we fix the legitimate user's transmit powers and the jamming data power as p u = q u = q j = 5 dB, and increase only the jamming pilot power p j . Fig. 3 illustrates the achievable rates in the first scenario, for different values of the jamming attack powers p j = q j . The achievable rates with the conventional MRC and MMSE-type receivers approach zero when p j , q j → ∞. However, the ZF-type receiver still performs well under strong jamming attacks. Moreover, we can see that the achievable rate with the ZF-type receiver converges to a non-zero value when the jamming data power q j tends to infinity, as long as the jamming pilot power p j grows proportionally to q j . Fig. 3 . Achievable rates for varying jamming powers p j , q j . Fig. 4 . Achievable rates for varying jamming pilot power p j . Fig. 4 shows the achievable rates according to the jamming pilot power p j , in the second scenario with fixed jamming data power. As expected, the achievable rate with the conventional MRC receiver decreases with the increase of the jamming powers. However, the proposed scheme, especially with the ZF-type receiver, still works well with strong jamming attacks. Moreover, it is interesting to see that the ZF-type receiver works better under stronger jamming pilot attacks, and even approaches the performance of the jamming-free case. We note that there are gaps between our approximate results and the simulation results when p j is very small. This is because in our large-scale approximation, we omit some small terms, which a.s. converge to zero when M → ∞, but still are significant when p j is small and M is finite. The gaps will disappear when M → ∞.
The results in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 are consistent with our analysis in Section IV-C and can be explained by the fact that the proposed receiver filters are constructed using the estimates of both the legitimate channel h and the jamming channel g. When the jamming pilot power p j increases, it does not only degrade the quality of the legitimate channel estimation but also improves the estimation quality of the jamming channel. Thus, the proposed receiver filters can improve the system performance if the improvement in the estimation quality of g overcomes the degradation in the estimation quality of h. Now, let us evaluate the performance of the proposed receiver filters when the jamming powers are limited and the jammer adjusts its power allocation between the pilot phase and the data transmission phase. In Fig. 5 , we assume that the jamming powers are constrained according to (49) and P j = p u = q u = 5 dB. From this figure we can see that a smart jammer, who is aware that the legitimate system is trying to estimate the jamming channel, would allocate less power to the pilot phase to minimize the rate. According to the asymptotic analysis from Proposition 3, the jammer should allocate its power as p asy−subopt j /q asy−subopt j = −5.0862 dB when the base station has infinitely many antennas. This result is close to the optimal jamming power allocation for the M = 100 antennas considered in this simulation. Moreover, we see that the proposed receiver filters work well and outperform the conventional MRC receiver even with an optimized smart jammer.
C. Impact of Power Allocation in the Legitimate System
Next, we evaluate the impact of different power allocations in the legitimate system on the performance. Fig. 6 illustrates the achievable rates for varying power ratios p u /q u of the legitimate user. We assume that the average power P u and the jamming powers are fixed as P u = p j = q j = 5 dB. It is observed that the achievable rates have their peak values at certain ratios of p u /q u . In other words, one has to balance between the powers spent by the pilot and data signals to achieve the best transmission rates. Moreover, we can see that the offsets between the asymptotic optimal power ratio (corresponding to the peak value of the asymptotic achievable rate with M → ∞) and the optimal power ratios for finite M (corresponding to the peak values of the achievable rates for MMSE-type and ZF-type receivers with M = 100) are relatively small. It is thus expected that the asymptotically optimal power allocation can be employed as a simple heuristic power allocation for systems with large but finite number of antennas M.
In Fig. 7 , we plot the achievable rates using different power allocations. All the achievable rates are achieved by the ZF-type receiver, except the one with the conventional MRC receiver, which is included for the comparison. In this figure, the "upper bound" curves are the achievable rate upper bounds, which are obtained by the optimal power allocation in (42). We can see that the achievable rate increases remarkably when using the simple asymptotically optimal power allocation in (38). Additionally, the achievable rate achieved by the proposed suboptimal power allocation in (47) is very close to the achievable rate upper bound.
D. Accuracies of the Estimates δ 1 and δ 2
Lastly, we numerically evaluate the accuracies of the estimations for δ 1 and δ 2 in (31). We consider p j = q j = 5 dB and p u = q u ∈ {0 dB, 5 dB, 10 dB}. In the upper sub-figure of Fig. 8 , we plot the normalized mean square errors (NMSEs) of the estimations in (31), i.e.,
, i = 1, 2. In the lower sub-figure of Fig. 8 , we show the achievable rates, which are calculated based on the exact values of (δ 1 , δ 2 ) (the curves with label "anal.") and based on the estimates ( δ 1 , δ 2 ) (the curves with label "est.").
We can see that the NMSEs are very small and approach zero when M tends to infinity. The estimation for δ 2 is especially good and independent of p u since δ 2 is not impacted by the desired pilot signal. Fig. 8 also shows that the achievable rates resulted from the estimations in (31) match very well with the actual achievable rates. Therefore, it is expected that the system can realize the achievable rate in (5) without the perfect knowledge of s j .
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
A new jamming-resistant receiver approach has been proposed to enhance the robustness of the massive MIMO uplink against jamming attacks. By exploiting purposely unused pilot sequences, the jamming channel can be estimated using the received pilot signal. The results show that the proposed receiver filters, which were constructed using the estimate of the jamming channel, can greatly reduce the effect of jamming attacks and improve the system performance. Moreover, the proposed scheme still works well, or even better, when the jamming power increases. Due to the critical effect of the jamming signal, a ZF-type receiver filter that focuses on nulling the jamming signal is a favorable approach for massive MIMO with jamming. We have also shown that judicious power allocations in the legitimate system can substantially improve the performance of the proposed receivers, and the gains remain even if the jammer adjusts its power optimally.
The proposed approach can be generalized to multiple legitimate users and also to a jammer with N antennas. The latter case was recently considered in [25] and basically requires the BS to estimate N jamming channel vectors and cancel the interference from these channels. In this case, one might not have N unused pilot sequences and then subspace methods or exploitation of timing/frequency offsets may be utilized for jamming rejection. 
Using the fact that γ j = τ p j δ 2 β j +σ 2 , we can rewrite (56) as
The right-hand side of (57) is non-negative since γ j = τ p j δ 2 β j + σ 2 ≥ σ 2 . Therefore, we have ρ ZF ≥ ρ RZF for all μ ≥ 0, which implies that the effective SINR ρ RZF approaches its maximum when μ → 0.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
The proof for Corollary 2 consists of two parts. 
